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The Curious Case of the  
Double Dissident
Neven Sesardić (Zagreb, Croatia)
14.1. INTRODUCTION
Taboos are not just about politics, morality, and religion. Even empirical statements 
can be taboo. Defend them publicly, and you will be personally attacked and called 
names. Worse, it is enough just to say in a private setting that you are not sure that 
a taboo statement is false, and you can still be vilified. A good example is the case of 
then Harvard law student Stephanie Grace, who in 2010 wrote the following in an 
email to a few of her friends:
I just hate leaving things where I feel I misstated my position. I absolutely do not rule 
out the possibility that African Americans are, on average, genetically predisposed to be 
less intelligent . . .
I think it is bad science to disagree with a conclusion in your heart, and then try (un-
successfully, so far at least) to find data that will confirm what you want to be true . . .
Please don’t pull a Larry Summers on me.1
Predictably, someone did pull a Larry Summers on her by publicizing her private 
email. A pandemonium ensued. Martha Minow, dean of the Harvard Law School, 
wrote in a public letter, with no justification, that Grace “suggested that black people 
are genetically inferior to white people” (see the link in note 1). It is quite clear that 
Grace did not do that. She did not commit herself to either side in the debate about 
the origins of racial differences in IQ.
Philosopher Brian Leiter claimed on his widely read law blog that Grace (a 
law student who was about to go on the job market) was “all-too-willing . . . to 
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entertain the most vicious racist stereotypes as possibilities,” and he also raised the 
question of whether the beleaguered student was, as he put it, “a right-wing racist 
and neanderthal.”2
Although Grace in the end apologized under tremendous pressure, she actually 
did nothing wrong. What she said was entirely reasonable—namely, given the lack 
of sufficient evidence about causes of group differences in IQ, she was simply not in 
the position to rule out the possibility that genes were involved in the explanation. 
Yet this whole situation showed that you can violate a taboo not only by defending 
the “offensive” empirical hypothesis but also by merely admitting (in private!) that 
you don’t have compelling reasons to dismiss it. Therefore, if you want to avoid being 
attacked, you are apparently left with only two choices: either a loud rejection of the 
taboo hypothesis or silence. Agnosticism is not an option.
I have written about this and other controversial issues myself, and I was also oc-
casionally labeled a fascist, sexist, racist, homophobe, etc. Some (nicer) people said 
they didn’t understand how someone whom they didn’t see as a bad person could end 
up holding such reprehensible opinions. Indeed, how?
This essay tries to answer that question, obviously from a biased personal perspec-
tive. It is only one story, but, if convincing, it could perhaps illustrate how views that 
many come to regard as offensive can actually be the product of a long and arduous 
process of back-and-forth deliberation, rather than a priori prejudice.
First, I have to clear up a possible problem with the word “dissident” in the title. 
Christopher Hitchens said that the word dissident “can’t be self-conferred because it 
is really a title of honor that has to be won or earned.”3 He is wrong. The meaning of 
dissident, according to most dictionaries, seems to be purely descriptive, for it refers 
simply to “a person who opposes official policy” (Oxford), or a person “disagreeing 
especially with an established religious or political system, organization, or belief ” 
(Merriam-Webster).4 There is nothing in itself honorific about “opposing official 
policy” or “disagreeing with an established system or belief.” Obviously, official 
policy and established belief may be reasonable, while opposition could be miscon-
ceived. Moreover, I knew some dissidents in communist Yugoslavia who were, in 
terms of their politics, creepier than most politicians from the ruling party. One of 
those dissidents was later convicted of war crimes (and some others probably should 
have been as well).
For better or worse, I was myself something of a political dissident during much 
of my academic career. There were two phases, with different contexts but also with 
some interesting similarities. The first phase extended throughout the 1980s when 
I published a dozen articles against the official Marxist ideology in Yugoslavia. The 
second period of my dissidence began after I moved abroad and wound up publicly 
defending “wrong” views on some politically controversial topics—“wrong” in the 
sense that my views went against the opinion that was (and still is) dominant in the 
academic community in the West.
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14.2. THE EASTERN FRONT
Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean was the head of a World War II British mission that 
was sent to Yugoslavia in 1943 to evaluate whether Yugoslav partisans under Tito’s 
leadership should receive British military support. Maclean met Churchill in Cairo 
and reported favorably about the partisans’ war effort. But he was also worried and 
warned Churchill that “Tito and the other leaders of the Movement were openly 
and avowedly Communist and that the system which they would establish would 
inevitably be on Soviet lines.”5 This gave rise to the following brief exchange:
“Do you intend,” [Churchill] asked, “to make Yugoslavia your home after the war?”
“No, Sir,” I replied.
“Neither do I,” he said. “And, that being so, the less you and I worry about the form 
of Government they set up, the better. That is for them to decide.”6
Well, I didn’t intend to make Yugoslavia my home either, but a few years after 
the war my poor soul was, without my consent, put into a body of a baby boy who 
was born in that country (which, indeed, as Maclean had anticipated, soon be-
came a one-party communist state and stayed that way for around half a century). 
Although Churchill said, “That is for them to decide,” surely he must have been 
aware that “they” would hardly have an opportunity to decide anything important 
for a very long time.
In elementary school I was told about the greatness of President Tito, and I 
dutifully believed it. But the first seed of doubt was planted when I was eleven or 
twelve, and my brother and I received as a gift a wonderful children’s encyclopedia 
in English. And there, in volume five of that Golden Book Encyclopedia (on page 
418), we were amazed to see that Tito was listed under the entry “Dictators,” to-
gether with Hitler and Stalin! Our Tito, a dictator? No way. We asked our father for 
an explanation, and his answer only increased our puzzlement. Although he was at 
the time a member of the Yugoslav Communist Party and moreover had fought on 
the side of the partisans during the war, he said detachedly, “Well, this is how many 
people in the West do see Tito.” The fact that he didn’t immediately and resolutely 
dismiss or condemn the description of Tito as a dictator made a huge impression 
on us. Our confusion was not resolved, but a mental note was made: there’s more 
to all this than meets the eye.
Soon I started to wonder about other things. Why were there elections in Yugo-
slavia at all, given that there was only one political party? And why was there only 
one party? I once raised that second question in front of my parents’ friends and 
one of them tried to get rid of me by giving the following answer: “You have to 
understand that virtually all people in Yugoslavia believe in communism. That’s why 
there can be no other parties.” I thought I had a killer counterargument against this 
explanation, so I pushed on: “All right, but even if all people believe in communism, 
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why wouldn’t we call the existing party Communist Party A and then create another 
communist party—say, Communist Party B—with a slightly different program? 
That way people could have a choice between two communist parties and elections 
would make sense.” I was very satisfied with my response and expected that others 
would find it impressive as well. But my adult “opponent” retorted without batting 
an eye: “This wouldn’t work, kid. You see, if besides the existing communist party 
(Communist Party A) a new option were introduced, your Communist Party B, 
what would happen is that everyone would instantly switch to this new party—and 
then we would again be left with only one party!” We all laughed because this man, 
himself a party member, clearly implied that everyone was unhappy with the existing 
communist party and that even all its current members would find any other party 
immediately preferable.
At the end of high school I fell in love with philosophy, and this is what I wanted 
to study at university. But not too much Marxism, please! I was already immensely 
bored with Marxist explanations that some of our school teachers gave for all kinds 
of phenomena, from history to economics, law and politics. It’s not, of course, that at 
the time I could have given better alternative accounts of all these things. I couldn’t. 
It’s just that I found the proposed Marxist explanations insipid, repetitive, intellectu-
ally unexciting, and tiresome. This was not my cup of (not infrequently Russian) tea.
After collecting information about the department of philosophy at the University 
of Zagreb (my hometown at the time), I concluded, foolishly as it turned out, that 
studying philosophy there would involve a tolerably low dose of Marxism. The first 
year was OK mainly because it was dominated by non-ideologically driven content 
like ancient philosophy and logic, although even in these subjects there were some 
warning signs (e.g., one of the readings for the introductory logic course was Lenin’s 
Philosophical Notebooks).
After the first year, the presence of Marxism increased. Most of my philosophy 
professors belonged to the so-called Praxis group, which started in 1964 with the 
founding of the Croatian (and heavily Marxist) philosophical journal Praxis. They 
presented their own work as being among the most important contributions to 
contemporary philosophy. Strangely enough, they managed to convince a lot of 
students. And while in our classes there was never any mention of the main critics of 
Marxism such as Böhm-Bawerk, Aron, Popper, Hayek, or von Mises, it was ensured 
that a ridiculous amount of Marxist literature was published in Croatian or Serbian 
translation, and many of these titles were assigned as required or recommended read-
ings to students. Special praise was constantly showered on the philosophers Ernst 
Bloch and György Lukács despite the fact that they had both been hardline Stalin-
ists during much of their careers. Mainly thanks to the campaigning of the Praxis 
group, Bloch and Lukács, of all people, were awarded honorary doctorates from the 
University of Zagreb in 1969.
Soon after graduation I was hired by my department to teach various topics in 
Anglo-American philosophy, an area of philosophy that was until then seriously ne-
glected in course offerings. It took a lot of time to prepare for classes because I had 
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learned almost nothing about that area during my studies. But rather than complain, 
I was extremely happy that I got a teaching position at a university, my dream job.
Being disillusioned with the Yugoslav political system, I didn’t have any interest 
in politics at that time. My plan was to isolate myself in the ivory tower (hopefully 
until retirement), focus completely on my research and teaching about esoteric 
philosophical issues, not allowing myself to be bothered too much by what was hap-
pening in the drab socialist world around me. But the plan quickly went off the rails.
Before long, new laws about education were introduced, according to which 
teachers were obligated to “adopt a Marxist approach in explaining natural and social 
phenomena.” Also, a new mandatory subject, “Basics of Marxism,” was introduced 
for all students in high schools and universities. My department was in charge of 
training a huge number of high school teachers to teach the new subject, and several 
of my department colleagues started teaching it at our university and elsewhere. The 
expansion of Marxism became suffocating. Since my own department obviously 
became a vehicle of the intensified ideological indoctrination, I decided I could no 
longer stay silent.
At the very beginning of the 1980s I published two articles in which I criticized 
the introductory course on Marxism being mandatory and exposed the utter ab-
surdity of legally forcing teachers to adopt a Marxist point of view. Paraphrasing 
Clausewitz’s well-known statement about war and politics, I described Marxism 
with such heavy-handed government support as “a continuation of philosophy by 
other means.” I was surprised that no one had raised these criticisms before because 
they were low-hanging fruit. The arguments to be made were so simple, obvious, 
and compelling (or at any rate they should have been) that they were practically 
writing themselves. Pure common sense.7 And not much courage was needed, ei-
ther. For although the communist regime in Yugoslavia was a bit erratic, it didn’t 
seem very likely that a philosopher would land in serious trouble just because he 
complained about the silly new arrangement according to which any teacher de-
fending a non-Marxist approach to any issue would be breaking a law and would 
consequently have to be punished.
Once I made these pretty obvious points against the government’s “Marxism pro-
tection program,” it was hard not to continue further. Now I wanted to go beyond 
the claim that Marxism should not be privileged, and argue that it is actually bad 
philosophy. This is what I tried to do in detail in a long article that was published in 
a Belgrade philosophical journal in 1984.
Did those in power find the anti-Marxist article published in a philosophy journal 
a huge cause for alarm? Hardly. Nevertheless, there was some grumbling. I found 
out in April 2021 that in the top-secret files of the Yugoslav state security from the 
1980s I was listed among “internal enemies” of the regime. And back in 1983 in 
a leaked communist party report about “ideological deviations” I could read that I 
was advocating “the most reactionary philosophy in the world.” Cool! A few months 
later, in a long interview published in Borba, the official newspaper of the Yugoslav 
Communist Party, a leading agitprop official (also known as “KGB,” because these 
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letters corresponded to his slightly modified initials) attacked several intellectuals by 
name (including me) and complained that no one had told this “trash” (as he called 
us) what it needed to hear—namely, “You, scum, we have had enough of your non-
sense!” This was followed by a threat: “It seems that with the waning of revolutionary 
enthusiasm these rats have crept out of their holes, but now we are waiting for the 
plague to beat them to death.” Fortunately, when in a few years the plague (i.e., the 
Yugoslav wars) did indeed arrive, we the “rats” survived because KGB’s comrades 
were no longer in power in Croatia.
Upon publication, my essay on Marxism was read by Ljubo Sirc, a Slovenian 
free-market economist and classical liberal who was teaching at the University of 
Glasgow. Since I devoted a lot of space to the criticism of Marx’s economic views (the 
labor theory of value and the theory of surplus value), Sirc found the essay interest-
ing and offered to publish it in an English translation as a booklet in a new series 
of which he was the editor (Friedrich Hayek was a member of the advisory board). 
The first book that appeared in the series, in 1984, was Market or Plan? by Milton 
Friedman. Clearly, this was an offer only a fool could refuse.
The booklet, consisting of my essay and a short commentary by Italian economist 
Domenico Settembrini, came out at the beginning of 1985.8 There was also a book 
launch in London, which I attended. The Times of London published a nice article 
by Roger Scruton in which he praised the book and said, among other things, “Re-
cently a Yugoslav philosophy journal carried a devastating critique of Marxism, and 
the author, Neven Sesardic of Zagreb University, has yet to be arrested.”9
Scruton apparently thought that I would soon be arrested, which didn’t happen, 
nor did I expect it to happen. It didn’t seem to me that at that time in Yugoslavia 
merely publishing an anti-Marxist philosophical treatise would be a jailable offense. 
Yet there were somewhat aggravating circumstances in my case. First, several political 
refugees from different parts of Yugoslavia showed up at my book launch in Lon-
don—mainly Serbs and Croats with irreconcilable political differences and yet all of 
them united in their lasting hate of Tito’s communist regime. I talked to leaders of 
some of these organizations and socialized with some of them afterwards. The Yugo-
slav secret police were not only following closely the activities of these “enemies” but 
also in the business of assassinating some of them in Germany, France, the United 
Kingdom, and elsewhere. An especially gruesome murder was the liquidation of 
Stjepan Đureković, a completely nonviolent Croatian dissident, which happened in 
Munich less than two years before my visit to London.
Second, Sirc had been sentenced to death in a show trial in Slovenia in 1947, 
avowedly as a spy and foreign agent, but the real reason was that he joined the short-
lived parliamentary opposition to the communists after the war. (One of the ironies 
of his condemnation was that he had actually fought on the side of Tito’s partisans.) 
Anyway, his death sentence was commuted to a twenty-year prison sentence, and 
after having served seven years (much of it in solitary confinement), Sirc escaped to 
Italy and eventually ended up in the United Kingdom. So, having an anti-commu-
nist book published abroad by an émigré, a convicted “enemy of the people,” and 
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still a very persistent and outspoken opponent of the Yugoslav regime, could have 
exacerbated my situation somewhat. Or at least it seemed so. But in fact upon my 
return home, I was never asked to explain anything about this affair.
My next project was to show that the Yugoslav Praxis philosophy was hugely 
overrated. The Praxis philosophers fancied themselves as political dissidents and, in 
Marx’s famous phrase, “ruthless critics of everything existing.” In reality, however, 
their ideas deviated very little from the official ideology of the Yugoslav Com-
munist Party. The conflict between them and the political establishment was like 
a quarrel within a family. The massive support and sympathy they received from 
their academic colleagues abroad was largely based on the mistaken belief that the 
Praxis philosophers were genuine democrats and opponents of every repression. But 
domestically (and hidden from their foreign sympathizers by a language barrier) 
they uncritically supported Yugoslav socialism as well as the political program of the 
ruling party. They vehemently denied that they had ever advocated the idea of a mul-
tiparty system in Yugoslavia, which was clearly the only road to democratization.10
I also pointed out in the mid-1980s that despite presenting themselves as uncom-
promising opponents of any nationalism, some actions of the Praxis philosophers 
showed distinct signs of Serbian nationalism. A few years later, my diagnosis was 
infamously confirmed when, during the Yugoslav wars, three leading members of 
the Praxis group took up top positions in the highly nationalist Serbian movement 
under Milošević and Karadžić, both of them soon to be indicted for war crimes. 
(Milošević died in the Hague before he could be convicted.) This finally opened the 
eyes of most Praxis fans in the West, many of whom took this as a reason to break 
off all relations with their former Yugoslav comrades.
I would like to believe that the criticisms of Marxism I published during the 1980s 
made an impact and changed some (or maybe many?) people’s minds. And, indeed, 
at the end of that decade people in Croatia did abandon Marxism in droves. But I 
am afraid I cannot take much credit for this, if any. In essence, the massive change of 
heart was brought about mostly by political events (the breakdown of communism), 
rather than being a trickle-down effect of philosophical arguments. Even after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, when at dusk the owl of Minerva started flapping its wings more 
energetically, it didn’t appear that its noise attracted a lot of attention.
14.3. THE WESTERN FRONT
In 1989, I went to Germany as a postdoc and stayed there around three years on 
two research fellowships. After a brief return to Croatia in 1992–1994 I again moved 
abroad and spent the remaining two decades of my academic career teaching at uni-
versities in the United States, Japan, England, and Hong Kong.
I had to work harder than before to build up my resumé and stay competitive 
in a tough international job market in philosophy. Yet at the beginning I was not sure 
which topics I should focus on. After initial enthusiasm about physicalism (the topic 
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of my dissertation), I noticed that most issues discussed in my field (the philosophy 
of science) left me cold. What was wrong with me?
Maybe nothing, I concluded with relief after having learned—through an unex-
pected channel—that when a newly appointed editor-in-chief of a top philosophy 
of science journal talked to “folks” about what they’d like to see in the journal, many 
replied that it would be great if the journal could be made more interesting. Wow, 
philosophers of science were saying that they found the content of one of their flag-
ship journals not sufficiently interesting, and possibly even boring!
Hence this was not just my problem. To explain my quandary, though, let me first 
quote from a short article from 1998 in which David Papineau, the editor-in-chief of 
the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, nicely described the dilemma about 
choosing a research topic and how philosophers could increase the chances of their 
papers being accepted for publication:
I now know that the best way to get published is to adopt a narrow focus, and make some 
specific point within a body of widely agreed assumptions. Of course, the point must 
not only be correct, but also of some significance. Still, the natural threshold is not high. 
As long as those working in the relevant area will benefit from the point, it is difficult 
to argue against publication. By contrast, more ambitious pieces, which seek to present 
some new perspective, or undermine some larger orthodoxy, are less likely to be accepted.11
Although this advice made a lot of sense, it did not resonate with me. I hope this will 
not sound arrogant, but my idea of the “love of wisdom” did not include adopting 
a narrow research focus and aiming for results with a low threshold of significance. 
On the contrary, I did dream of challenging some larger orthodoxy;12 and I thought 
it would be great if I could find arguments against an orthodoxy that is about a 
problem with real-world implications, rather than a view about an abstruse issue in 
pure philosophy.
Wasn’t this dream unrealistic? I certainly wondered about that myself. Yet I kept 
looking and eventually I found out that there were indeed challengeable orthodoxies, 
and that, moreover, they were hidden in plain sight.
Consider the following questions:
1. Should the institution of marriage be open only to heterosexual couples?
2. Is racial profiling sometimes justified?
3. Is the gender imbalance in philosophy and STEM disciplines the result of
processes that do not include systematic discrimination against women?
4. Is the black–white gap in IQ partly caused by genetic differences?
Currently it is orthodoxy in philosophy, as well as in many other academic disci-
plines, to answer all of these questions with “No.” It is not just that the huge majority 
answers each of these questions in the negative. Rather, the affirmative answer is met 
not only with (cognitive) disagreement but often also with that famous “incredulous 
stare” coupled with moral condemnation. Therefore, if one agrees with the answer 
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“Yes” in any of these cases, one will often have a reason to keep silent or sometimes 
even find it prudent to say aloud “No.” Why risk being called a racist, sexist, or 
homophobe? After all, these labels do have serious consequences.
Now if there is this kind of political pressure in academia not to defend certain 
views, then these views will get defended less often. Consequently, it is to be expected 
that some good arguments for these views will remain underdeveloped, unpublished, 
or even undiscovered. The opposite will happen with the “encouraged” views. Even 
bad arguments for the orthodoxy will be tolerated or treated leniently, as they would 
indicate that their authors at least had their hearts (though not necessarily their 
brains) in the right place.
As a result of such a situation, the probability will rise of there being some as-
yet unknown good arguments for “Yes” waiting to be brought to light. For, under 
the circumstances, there wouldn’t be much competition among scholars to explore 
or defend these arguments, let alone publish them. Therefore, this would present 
a good opportunity for not-too-timid researchers to try and make a significant 
scholarly contribution. As E. O. Wilson once said, “When you walk on the edge 
of a volcano, there are few others competing with you, and you have great chances 
for important discoveries.”13
It happens that, with respect to each of these four questions, I have myself either 
defended in print the “Yes” answer or argued that this answer didn’t receive a fair hear-
ing and that it is much more plausible than most people in academia have thought. 
However, I didn’t adopt this view in a calculating manner (i.e., hoping that in this 
way I would be more likely to stumble on a good new argument). My choice of these 
topics was determined by curiosity and my strong aversion to any sort of ideologi-
cally imposed orthodoxy, which I acquired during my fights on “the Eastern Front” 
(described in section two). Besides my own aversion, I think that, due to my previous 
experience, it may also have been easier for me to detect the influence of ideology on 
scholarly debates. Not that this was very difficult to do, of course; it’s just that I was 
probably more attuned to this phenomenon and was less likely to miss it.
I started detecting an influence of political ideology on discussions in the philoso-
phy of science in the mid-1980s when I first read the debate between Arthur Jensen 
and Richard Lewontin about race, IQ, and heritability. I couldn’t immediately make 
up my mind about who was right. However, I noticed something odd about that 
discussion: while Lewontin was claiming that Jensen’s defense of hereditarianism was 
motivated by his (allegedly reprehensible) political views, it was actually Lewontin, 
rather than Jensen, who was often inserting his own politics into discussions about 
purely empirical issues. I was intrigued.
After studying the debate in more depth, I came to the conclusion that Lewontin’s 
main criticisms of Jensen were flimsy and unconvincing. Moreover, it seemed to me 
that the weaknesses of Lewontin’s arguments were not so difficult to recognize. Yet 
philosophers of science at the time virtually all sided with Lewontin. Many of the 
leading figures in the field fell under his influence when they were invited to spend 
time in his lab at Harvard. Tellingly, a prominent philosopher of science told me that 
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he decided to decline Lewontin’s invitation to Harvard because he was afraid that 
otherwise he might also be impacted by this “guru effect” and that, like his other 
colleagues, he would be unable to preserve his full independence of mind.
The pro-Lewontin bias in the philosophy of science was expressed in various 
ways. A striking illustration is how I ran into unexpected troubles (twice) because I 
had cited the following negative comment about Lewontin from a letter that Ernst 
Mayr, one of the leading evolutionary biologists of the twentieth century, sent to 
Cambridge geneticist A. W. F. Edwards in 2003:
Thank you for your letter of 20 Aug [2003] and your reprint about Lewontin’s trickery. 
I had already some years ago called attention to Lewontin’s misleading claims. I sug-
gest Lewontin’s book The Triple Helix. The unwary reader will not discover how totally 
biased his presentation is. All evidence opposed to his claims is simply omitted! And if 
you present the truth you are denounced as a Nazi or Fascist!14
By the time of my communication with Edwards, Mayr had already passed away.
In one case the editor removed this citation from my submission (which had 
already been accepted for publication), arguing that it was just an unnecessary rep-
etition of the point already made earlier. I disagreed strongly because I thought that 
quoting such strong negative words from someone like Mayr might jolt at least some 
philosophers of science out of their uncritical admiration for their biologist hero. I 
tried to explain to the editor that, contrary to what he was saying, “given both Mayr’s 
stature and also his strong presence in the philosophy of biology discussions, at the 
very least his opinion about Lewontin would surely be of great historical interest to 
most readers.” To no avail.
In the case of another publication of mine, an editor again insisted on taking 
out the Mayr citation, this time arguing that keeping it in my text would cross the 
limit of what “we consider can safely be put forward as a published contribution to 
the debate.” I was puzzled and asked why including it would make the whole thing 
“unsafe” to publish, but didn’t receive an answer. Mayr was censored again.
During the 2000s I put out a few papers and a book15 in which I explained why 
I rejected “the received view” in philosophy of science about the nature–nurture is-
sue. The fact that these writings were accepted for publication in good venues was, I 
thought, a sign that my arguments had some merit. Particularly because hereditari-
anism (which I defended) was, and unfortunately still is, often automatically associ-
ated with racism and is dismissed.
Arguably, I had a lot of luck too. For example, the editor of the series in which 
my book was published was a very easygoing, humorous, and atypically nonpolitical 
guy. His duty as the editor after the extensive peer review (seven referee reports on 
the initial draft of my manuscript) was to check for possible problems in the final 
version of my submission. But when I met him at a philosophy of science confer-
ence in 2002 he told me that, when I submitted the final draft, he didn’t intend to 
interfere with anything in the text as long as I didn’t write something like “XY has a 
small dick” (XY being one of the philosophers I criticized). And I didn’t.
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Unorthodox positions on sensitive issues do not always remain undefended in 
philosophy just because of the fear of backlash. Rather, some philosophers may be 
quite willing to advocate these views but they decide not to simply because they have 
good reasons to believe that such articles, even when well-argued, might be practi-
cally impossible to publish.
A case in point: in the 2000s I thought that there was a clear need for some op-
position to the complete dominance of social constructivism in the philosophical 
literature about race. Yet the orthodoxy had hardened so much that it seemed that 
such an article had little chance of passing peer review (particularly if it would also 
touch upon the most controversial question of whether some observed psychologi-
cal differences between races might be partly due to genetic differences). In a 2008 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) entry about race,16 it was suggested that 
“the biological conception of race is philosophically and scientifically dead.” With 
such an authoritative source declaring the debate more or less closed, the prospect of 
bringing back to life what was widely regarded as a (doubly) dead hypothesis (which 
was also often associated with racism) looked rather gloomy.
Yet, when I received a personal invitation to submit an article for possible publica-
tion in The Monist’s issue about race, I accepted it because I knew that the editors 
were aware of my heterodox opinion on race and I supposed that they were OK with 
it. But my submission was soon rejected (with only a generic explanation) and I was 
left with an article in which I invested a lot of effort and that was, to all appearances, 
unpublishable. The unexpected happened, though, and the next submission—to a 
more prominent journal—was successful. (Incidentally, this turned out to be my 
most cited article.)
Another case involves my paper on racial profiling. I had been thinking about 
writing on that issue for a long time, but particularly at the peak of the Black Lives 
Matter (BLM) movement, when I thought that bringing clarity to this topic was 
of paramount importance. However, the support for BLM among my philosopher 
colleagues was so great that I concluded that trying to publish something critical of 
this movement in a good philosophy journal would very probably be a waste of time. 
Therefore, the project did not really get off the ground.
Things changed in September of 2016 when I received an email from philoso-
pher Guillaume Attia, who invited me to write an essay about BLM for his online 
philosophical journal The Critique,17 which had been launched in 2014. In a short 
span of time the journal had managed to attract several good contributors and a fair 
amount of interest among readers. I was still afraid that my submission would be 
rejected in the end for purely ideological reasons. Was Attia (who was black) really 
ready to publish something that was bound to invite the ire of BLM as well as its 
many impassioned supporters in academia? I had to ask him directly, which I did:
I worry that I might invest a lot of time and effort in preparing an essay, only to learn 
in the end that the editors were expecting something quite different or that they did 
not like the particular approach to the topic. Is there anything that you could add to 
your very useful instructions that could make that kind of misunderstanding less likely?
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To which Attia promptly responded as follows:
Not to worry. I give a lot of liberty to my writers to write what they want to write about 
without coercion or pressure to change the topic entirely . . . I am also a firm defender 
of my writers’ freedom of expression. I am not afraid to publish ideas that are deemed 
“controversial” or “offensive,” so I am not one to commission an article then reject it 
upon submission because the stuff that has been written is sacrilege for one ideological 
position or another.
Wow. He earned my considerable respect with this attitude. Since I really couldn’t 
get stronger reassurance, I immediately started working on the paper and in several 
months submitted it. But there was no response from Attia, except a short message 
to the effect that he was recovering from an illness and that he would reply soon. But 
he never did. No new articles have appeared in The Critique since February 2017. 
Everything stopped. I am afraid that Attia may have died or something terrible hap-
pened. I do hope I am wrong.
But what was I supposed to do with the wretched article? As far as I could see, 
a single realistic option remained. Among good philosophy journals, to my knowl-
edge, only one has been systematically open to accepting politically controversial 
articles: the Israeli journal Philosophia. I submitted the paper there, and thankfully 
after a short time it was accepted for publication, practically as it was. Mazel tov!
For a long time, the greatest taboo in academia has been questions about racial 
differences in psychology. But of late the topic of sex differences has been quickly 
catching up. Some of these issues are addressed in an article about women in phi-
losophy that my then colleague Rafael De Clercq and I wrote together.18 Around 
that time our discipline had become obsessed with the sense of guilt springing from 
the belief that women are systematically treated unfairly in philosophy and that 
something urgently needs to be done about this. It is, of course, well known that the 
proportion of women in philosophy has been constantly and substantially below 50 
percent. Philosophers started with that fact and jumped to the conclusion that the 
underrepresentation of women was the result of discrimination. Hastily and with-
out much reflection, various measures were proposed and implemented in order to 
fight the alleged discrimination: changing hiring procedures, sensitivity training, the 
SEP urging its writers to make an effort to cite more female authors, an inordinate 
amount of attention devoted to feminism (e.g., in the SEP), formation of climate 
committees, and so forth. It was as if a doctor had started treating someone without 
first ascertaining that the person needed medical attention.
Three pieces of evidence offered in support of the discrimination hypothesis 
were (1) the low percentage of women in philosophy, (2) the implicit association 
test (IAT), and (3) so-called “stereotype threat.” Rafael and I argued not only that 
points 1–3 did not support a conclusion of discrimination but also that there was 
further evidence to the contrary that was usually ignored. The low percentage of 
women in our field was a mere statistical fact that could be the result of different 
causal scenarios, with discrimination being only one of the several possibilities. 
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Therefore, the widely accepted inference that female underrepresentation is in it-
self an indication of discrimination was blatantly fallacious. We also tried to show 
that the arguments relying on IAT and stereotype threat were seriously flawed be-
cause the studies of these two phenomena were known to be riddled with so many 
methodological problems that they could not be used as evidence in support of the 
discrimination hypothesis.
All in all, there was something surreal about this excessive concern for merely 
possible (but unproved) bias against women in philosophy. Since virtually everyone 
in the discipline strongly condemned the supposedly massive anti-woman bias, the 
question arose as to who these numerous “sexists” and “bigots” could be. A widely 
accepted answer has been that there is implicit bias in philosophy. According to this 
view, even those who sincerely condemn discrimination actually discriminate uncon-
sciously. So, many were happy to demonstrate their concern for the plight of women 
in philosophy by accepting their own responsibility for the situation, even though 
there was actually no good evidence for that. It was virtue signaling with a vengeance!
After completing our paper and not receiving strong objections from a number of 
colleagues (including some who disagreed with our central claim), we were ready to 
stick our necks out in public. As far as we knew, no one before us, except Andrew Ir-
vine,19 had publicly criticized the discrimination hypothesis in the philosophy context.
Things did not start well. We received two desk rejections, and one of them was 
especially discouraging. It was from a philosophy journal with a conservative editor-
in-chief, which we had hoped would make it a more hospitable environment for a 
submission that challenged leftist pieties. Additionally, the editor’s way of explaining 
the rejection was particularly disappointing. Almost two months after our submis-
sion, he wrote in a personal email, “We tend not to publish papers which might not 
be of interest to the wider philosophical community.” This explanation did not make 
much sense to us. At the time, it was hard to think of an issue of more interest to 
the philosophical community than the question of women’s underrepresentation in 
philosophy. Everybody was talking about it! Hence, we could not rule out the pos-
sibility that the real reason for rejection was that even conservative philosophers were 
uneasy about publishing that kind of paper.
Concluding that the chances of placing our article in a philosophy journal were 
probably much lower than we had initially thought, we submitted it to Academic 
Questions, a journal published by the National Association of Scholars (NAS), which 
is widely perceived as a conservative organization. It was accepted.20 It is possible 
that the choice of publication venue may have dampened the impact of our article 
because the fact that it did not appear in a regular academic journal likely made it 
look partisan and perhaps even biased. There was considerable irony here. For it was 
precisely because of the bias in mainstream philosophy that we were forced to cast 
our net more widely in the attempt to find a home for our paper, but then after our 
article finally saw the light of day it may have been regarded as biased just because it 
was not published in any of the mainstream journals (to which we stopped submit-
ting because we saw them as biased). It was a Catch-22.
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In 2007, I published an article in Croatian21 in which I tried to show that the vic-
tory of gay marriage was won either by ignoring the strongest arguments against it or 
by addressing them in their strawman version. Two reactions to that article show how 
high the emotions run in this debate. A few months after publication, I unexpect-
edly received the following email from a very distinguished philosopher whose work 
I respect a lot but with whom I have seldom been in contact:
Neven, I have to say that my heart sank when I saw the title of the piece on your website 
in which you criticize arguments that defend gay marriage. Of course I couldn’t find out 
what your arguments are, since the paper is in Croatian. But still, I’m worried . . . Since 
I think that gay marriage would make our society better, I wish you hadn’t devoted your 
considerable talents to debunking the arguments that are out there.
I was very surprised that my article alarmed this philosopher so much, especially 
given that, on his own admission, he didn’t know at all what my arguments were. 
Furthermore, from the article’s abstract (in English) it was quite clear that I didn’t 
even argue against gay marriage but only tried to show that the opposition to it was 
dismissed without properly addressing the main reasons for resisting it. Finally, his 
belief that “gay marriage would make our society better” was hardly dispositive, since 
obviously many people disagreed with that judgment.
A few years later, I received a very different email from a scholar who said he had 
found my article “quite stimulating” after he had created a rough but, to some ex-
tent, usable English translation with the help of Google Translate. He had a Harvard 
PhD and ended his message (from his Harvard email address!) thusly:
I would appreciate it if you would keep to yourself my admiration of your work. I am 
sure that you understand this regrettable necessity (at least until I get tenure!).
Regrettable, indeed, but also understandable. This was not the only case wherein 
someone I didn’t know approached me to express support but asked me to keep 
it confidential.
Some ten years ago I started thinking about writing an article that would cata-
logue examples of famous analytic philosophers supporting communist totalitarian-
ism and other extreme leftist ideas. I soon discovered that there were many more 
such examples than I had originally thought. The final result of my research was not 
an article but a book of more than 250 pages,22 despite the fact that there remained 
a lot of material that had to be left out.
Concerning the public reactions of philosophers to that book, it seems that “it fell 
still-born from the press” (to use Hume’s famous words). Why is that? One obvious 
possibility is that the book was not particularly good or interesting. Another expla-
nation has been suggested by a very distinguished philosopher (himself a leftist, and 
possibly not of a very moderate variety), who read the manuscript before publication 
and correctly predicted that it would have little philosophical impact:
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In the face of the undoubted truth that a huge majority of the “professional” philosophi-
cal community is antecedently left-wing, so to speak, [it] will shout down anybody who 
questions their orthodoxy. But given that undoubted truth, I wonder who you are writ-
ing it for. It is inevitable that nearly all philosophers will shout it down without thinking, 
and not many non-philosophers are going to be that interested. [emphasis added]
There was one minor victory, though. In the book I criticized the principal editor 
of the SEP, Edward Zalta, who in his article about Frege had written the following:
Unfortunately, his last years saw him become politically conservative and right-wing. 
His diary for a brief period in 1924 show[s] sympathies for fascism and anti-Semitism.
I argued that the use of the word “unfortunately,” which here implied condemning 
someone merely because he became politically conservative and right wing, was 
clearly very biased politically. Surely, I continued, it is hard to imagine that an SEP 
article about a famous philosopher could contain a similar sentence but with the fol-
lowing left-right inversion: “Unfortunately, X’s last years saw him become politically 
progressive and left-wing.”
Three months after the publication of my book, Zalta’s article was quietly revised 
and it now reads:
Unfortunately, [Frege’s] last years saw him become more than just politically conserva-
tive and right-wing—his diary for a brief period in 1924 show[s] sympathies for fascism 
and anti-Semitism.” [The words in bold were added in the version of March 2017, and 
two separate sentences from the previous version were now collapsed into one.]23
14.4. CONCLUSION
What was the main difference between my battles on two different fronts? On the 
Eastern front, the fight was against a system that was ultimately protected by an 
undemocratic government and its instruments of oppression. On the brighter side of 
this struggle, a dissident occasionally earned some respect even from some members 
of the Communist Party, who were aware that their power was devoid of any political 
legitimacy. Besides, a number of colleagues at the university, outside of ideologically 
more rigid departments like philosophy and sociology, found ways to express their 
support or appreciation, and show that they were on the side of heterodoxy. And 
this was very rewarding.
On the Western front, by contrast, it is precisely within the ivory tower, among 
one’s own colleagues, that—when opposing an opinion close to the heart of the 
majority—one will frequently “feel the gradient of collective alarm and disapproval 
like a deepening chill as one approaches the forbidden area,” as Linda Gottfredson 
memorably put it.24 This kind of strong disapprobation will be more or less inevitable, 
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and it will often be followed by personal attacks and character assassination. Or, to 
put it in Seussian terms, you as a dissenter will not necessarily be accused of being as 
awful as the small-hearted and unreformed Grinch, but you will definitely be seen as 
someone who rudely disrupts the harmony and contentedness of the liberal Whoville.
How can you solve this problem? I recommend retirement.25
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